). The normal process of comprehension, according to this theory, depends on procedures that construct models of the situations that are described by discourse. An assertion that describes a particular situation is represented by a single model, even if the description is incomplete or indeterminate, and this model may embody plausible assumptions based on general knowledge and even arbitrary assumptions if relevant information is lacking. If such assumptions turn out to be wrong in the light of subsequent discourse, the procedures can, if possible, revise the model so as to make it consistent with the discourse as a whole. The content captured in a model is therefore a function of both the model and the processes that revise and evaluate it. There are limits on the revision of a model: People forget the original description, the process of revision may place too great a cognitive load on the system, and so on. Nevertheless, it is possible to advance a psychological theory of inference based on the idea of manipulating models.
The general semantic principle that governs all valid deduction is that an inference is valid if its conclusion is true in every possible interpretation of its premises. In their study of syllogistic inference, Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) argued that the difficulty of a syllogism depends on two main factors:
1. The number of models to be constructed in trying to establish a valid conclusion, given that the processing capacity of working memory is limited; 2. The particular figure of the premises, given that the order in which information is produced from working memory is optimally the order in which it entered working memory. In this section, we will describe the latest version of the model theory (which is a slight modification of the theory in Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and the figural hypothesis. Syllogistic reasoning depends on three principal stages: the interpretation of the premises, the formulation of a putative conclusion, and the testing of its validity. According to the model theory, reasoners proceed as follows: (a) they begin by constructing a model of the premises that makes explicit the minimum amount of information; (b) they then use this model to try to formulate a parsimonious conclusion that expresses a relation not asserted by any of the premises; and (c) to test the validity of a conclusion, they search for an alternative model of the premises that falsifies the conclusion, perhaps fleshing out the initial models more explicitly in order to do so. The interpretation of a premise of the form All the athletes are bakers yields the following sort of model: The number of tokens representing a set is assumed to be arbitrary, though always small and plural. The principles for forming an integrated model that combines the interpretations of the two premises are straightforward. First, following Johnson-Laird and Bara (1984) , two operations may be used to bring the tokens corresponding to the middle terms into contiguity: (a) reversing the order of the two models before they are combined, and (b) inverting the order of the items in a model. These operations account for various effects of figure, and they apply according to the figure of the premises in the following way: Conclusions are formulated by describing the relation between the tokens representing the two end terms (i.e., the two terms that occur in separate premises). If there are no negative tokens in a model, then the description is affirmative: If each end token, x, occurs in an individual that also contains the other end token, y, then the conclusion is All the X are Y.
Otherwise, if at least one end token, x, occurs in an individual that also contains the other end token, y, then the conclusion is Some of the X are Y.
And if this condition fails, then no valid conclusion can be drawn. If there is a negative token in a model, then the conclusion is negative: If the end tokens, x and y, do not occur in the same individual, and at least one of these two sets is exhaustively represented, then the conclusion is None of the X is a Y.
Otherwise, if at least one individual is an x but not a y, then the conclusion is Some of the X are not Y.
And if this condition fails, then no valid conclusion can be drawn.
The theory postulates that human reasoners attempt to search for alternative models that will falsify putative conclusions. The evidence, as we shall see, implies that they have no simple or certain algorithm for making such searches. Indeed, little is known about how they attempt to make searches beyond the fact that the task is difficult and likely to defeat them. The computer program implementing the theory accordingly draws conclusions from the initial model of the premises, scanning the model first in one direction and then the other; it then uses three sorts of operation to search for alternative modelsbreaking individuals into two, adding new individuals to the model, or joining two separate individuals into one. The operations may not be psychologically realistic; they are designed merely to ensure that the program's search is ultimately complete. For an affirmative conclusion, if there is an individual containing both end tokens, a and c, and the middle term, b, which is not exhausted, the first operation breaks this individual into two separate individuals: Each model is a possible situation described by the premises, and a valid conclusion must hold in all of them-unless it merely states a possibility. In some cases where the premises yield three models, a slight change in the algorithm will yield only two models. At present, we have no way of discriminating between these alternatives (cf. Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984, who also described two distinct computer programs, one of which never constructed more than two models of the premises, and the other of which, where possible, constructed three models of the premises). The theory accordingly draws the critical distinction between one-model problems and multiple-model problems. The Appendix presents all 64 possible pairs of premises and indicates the 10 one-model problems and the 17 multiple-model problems with valid conclusions (Tables A1-A4 ). The remaining 37 pairs of premises are multiple-model problems with no conclusion that holds for all the models, and so they have no valid conclusion interrelating the end terms.
Componential study of syllogistic inference in children, adolescents, and adults If the model theory is correct, the development of syllogistic reasoning occurs under the influence, not of a specific mechanism for formal rules, but of a few basic underlying modules that concern the construction of models, their linguistic descriptions, and the search for falsifying models. This claim is akin to Sternberg's (1985) analysis of intellectual components, where a component is an elementary information process that operates on internal representations. The goal of the present study is therefore to determine the basic component skills of syllogistic reasoning according to the model theory; to devise experimental tests to measure each of these components; and to assess the extent to which competence at each of these components accounts for syllogistic ability at all stages of development from childhood through adolescence to adulthood.
The theory of models implicates five major components in syllogistic inference:
1. The interpretation of the premises depends on the ability to understand the meaning of quantified expressions. Likewise, the formulation of a conclusion that holds in one or more models depends on a comprehension of the meaning of quantifiers.
2. The integration of the information from the second premise depends on establishing that it refers to entities introduced into the model according to the first premise. Unless reasoners grasp this relation, which is based on the two occurrences of the middle term, they will be unable to integrate the two premises. This process is evidently sensitive to the figure of the syllogism. Conversely, individuals who have difficulty in establishing referential relations will have problems in integrating information from premises in which the two occurrences of the middle term are not contiguous.
3. After the formulation of a conclusion, reasoners must search for counterexamples if they have to reach a valid conclusion for multiple-model problems or to declare correctly that there is no valid conclusion (holding between the end terms). We need to ascertain whether subjects of different ages realize that it is necessary to test a putative conclusion by searching for counterexamples to it, and whether they are able to do so. This ability is clearly primarily relevant to coping with multiple-model problems: The correct response to a onemodel problem does not call for any ability to search for counterexamples.
4. The construction and falsification of models depends on the ability to notice identities between them. This ability is obviously necessary if subjects are to discern what conclusion, if any, holds over a set of models. It is also likely to play a part in the integration of information from the two premises. Hence, it should predict inferential ability with all sorts of syllogisms, valid and invalid.
5. The formulation of conclusions and the search for counterexamples depend on a working memory that has a sufficient processing capacity. This capacity develops with age (see Baddeley, 1986). Hence, we can predict that syllogistic ability-granted that it is an inferential process, rather than a superficial matter of matching premises-should also develop with age. Although it is commonly asserted that a development in syllogistic ability does occur, it does not seem to have been studied in any comprehensive cross-sectional study (though see Johnson-Laird et al., 1986, for a comparison of children 9-10 and 11-12 years of age).
There is at least one other ability necessary for successful syllogistic reasoning. An important component in understanding is the process of parsing the premises and combining the meanings of their constituents according to the grammatical relations between them. We did not attempt to assess this ability, but rather assumed that it was part of some of the components that we did measure, (e.g., the ability to understand quantified assertions). There is no simple way in which to factor out this component and to examine it in isolation from other mechanisms.
EXPERIMENT

METHOD
Experimental tasks to test the five components
Interpretation of quantifiers. We assessed the subjects' interpretations of quantified assertions by asking them to classify a set of drawings in terms of those that were truthfully described and those that were falsely described by assertions in the four moods. The drawings corresponded to the main set-theoretic relations that can hold between two sets: A and B have the same members; A is a proper subset of B; B is a proper subset of A; A and B overlap in their members; A and B are disjoint. For this test to make sense to the children, the drawings were made so that A was a set of women and B was a set of dancers. The drawings were put on a table in front of a subject in a random order, and, for each sentence, the subject was invited to choose the drawings that were consistent with the description. Rdferential integration of sentences. As in Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982), the subjects listened to spatial descriptions of objects and then attempted to place actual objects into the appropriate positions on a table. To avoid confusion, the table was covered by a large sheet of paper labeled with the four cardinal points:
FRONT
We presented three series of problems in a predetermined order of increasing difficulty. Each series consisted of four trials in a different randomized order for every subject. The first series were problems with two coreferential sentences, such as
The pear is behind the book. The book is to the right of the cup.
The second series were problems with three coreferential sentences, such as
The ring is in front of the watch. The watch is to the left of the necklace. The necklace is in front of the pendants.
The third series were problems in which either the last two sentences or the first two sentences did not contain coreferential items, such as
The album is behind the brush. The pen is in front of the bottle. The pen is to the left of the brush.
In this case, the subjects can integrate the information only after they interpret the third assertion. Search for counterexamples. The subjects were given three trials with a task that tested their grasp of the "logic" of falsification. The experimenter put seven small toys ("Smurfs") on the table in a random order together with seven drawings representing each of them. The experimenter then removed all the toys and put some of the them in a box labeled with a description. The subjects' task was to find out whether or not the label was an accurate description of the contents of the box. They did so by picking out a drawing and asking the experimenter whether the corresponding toy was in the box. The essential insight is that those toys that do not fit the description are crucial, because if one of them is in the box the label is false. According to the model theory, the task bears on syllogisms because a test of the validity of a conclusion depends on searching for models that do not fit the conclusion. The three tasks progressively increased the complexity of the description, which has been shown to affect insight into falsification in this task (Oakhill & Johnson-Laird, 1985) . The first trial used a simple description ("motorist"), the second trial used a conjunctive description ("musician with wind instrument"), and the third trial used a disjunctive description ("chef with spoon or food").
Perception of identities. To test subjects' ability to find identical elements in models, we presented them with pairs of drawings in which they were asked to mark in pen on each drawing that part that was identical in the pair. The seven pairs of drawings were presented in a predetermined order of increasing difficulty. The first pair of drawings consisted of (a) a triangle and (b) a triangle on the top of a square, whereas the seventh pair consisted of (a) a girl carrying a decorated box and (b) a country scene of a farmhouse with mountains in the distance-the identical element was the lid of the box, which matched the roof of one of the farm buildings.
Processing capacity of working memory. To assess the subjects' working memory capacity, we tested their ability to recall series of spoken digits. In the first part of the test, they had to repeat the digits in the same sequence as they had heard them. The initial trial was a series of two digits, and for each of the subsequent trials the number of digits to be recalled was increased by one. If subjects made an error, they were presented with a different series of the same length. If they erred again, the test was terminated; but if they were correct, the normal trials resumed with a longer series. In the second part of the test, the procedure was identical except that the subjects' task was to repeat the digits backward (i.e., in the opposite order to which they had heard them). The number of digits the subjects were able to repeat correctly was recorded.
Subjects
Sixty subjects belonging to three different age groups participated. We selected 20 children 9-10 years of age from a local school in Florence, Italy, on the basis of their teachers' assessment that they were progressing well at school and had the sort of home background that suggested that they were likely to go to university. We used this procedure to maximize our chances of selecting children who would be able to cope with the task (see Johnson-Laird et al., 1986). The group was made up of 7 females and 13 males. We tested 20 adolescents at high school (10 females and 10 males) who volunteered to take part in the experiment. The high school was one commonly considered to be an intermediate step toward university. We tested 20 adult volunteers (10 females and 10 males) who were university students over the age of 21 years and attending courses in the Department of Psychology at the University of Florence. None of the subjects had attended any courses in logic. The children received small gifts for participating in the experiment, and the other subjects were paid 8,000 lira (approximately $6.50).
Design and materials
Three groups of subjects participated: children 9-10 years of age, adolescents 14-15 years of age, and adults over the age of 21 years. The subjects took part in two sessions: In the first session, we examined their ability to draw their own conclusions from syllogistic premises. The children were tested with 28 logically distinct syllogisms: all 10 one-model syllogisms, 9 multiple-model syllogisms with valid conclusions (interrelating the end terms), and 9 multiple-model problems with no valid conclusions (interrelating the end terms). This subset of syllogisms contained the easiest syllogisms, selected according to the results of our previous experiments. The adolescent and adult groups were tested with all 64 possible pairs of syllogistic premises. We tested the children with a smaller number of syllogisms because they tired after about 30 syllogisms. The syllogisms were presented in two different random orders, randomly assigned to the subjects, balancing according to the gender of the subjects.2 In the second session, a few days after the first, we gave the subjects the five tests designed to assess the basic components predicted to underlie syllogistic performance. They were presented in the following order: the perception of identities, the grasp of coreference, the capacity of working memory, the comprehension of quantified assertions, and the ability to search for counterexamples. Although the use of a fixed order made it impossible to control or to assess either effects of practice or residual effects from one test to another, in our view the procedural advantage of a fixed order outweighed the danger of gross effects of these types.
Procedure
The subjects were tested individually in a quiet room. They were told that they were going to take part in an experiment on how people reason. Their task was to state in their own words what conclusion, if any, followed from the statement of each problem. If they considered that nothing followed, then they were to say so. To familiarize the subjects with the reasoning task, the experimenter verbally presented six 3-term problems, two of them without valid conclusions interrelating the end terms. If the subjects made a wrong response to any of these practice problems, they were encouraged to try again. Once the subjects understood the nature of the reasoning task, the real test followed. Because the children were slower to read the premises than the other two groups, we minimized this difference using the following procedure. The experimenter read the first premise of a syllogism. When the subject nodded, the experimenter read the second premise, and at the same time put the typewritten premises on the table. The subjects were told that the maximum time they could take to respond to a syllogism was 2 min. The experimenter recorded the subjects' verbal response to the premises.
In the second session, the experimenter carried out the five tests of the component abilities. Each test was explained in sufficient detail for the subjects to grasp what was demanded of them. Table 1 The results also corroborate the figural effects. There are many possible ways in which to present the data, but they yield comparable effects. Table 2 shows the percentages of A-C conclusions for those problems where an A-C or a C-A conclusion is valid; the balance of the percentages are for C-A conclusions. In figure A- The model theory predicts a decline of correct conclusions over the four figures of premises, and an increase of "no valid conclusion" responses. Table 3 shows the percentages of correct valid conclusions to all syllogisms as a function of figure. The expected decline as the difficulty of figure increases is highly reliable (Page's L Test, z = 6.46, p < .000001). To retain the greatest possible amount of information, we have always considered (with the exception of Table 1) data coming from the entire set of 64 syllogisms for adolescents and adults. Because the subset of 28 represents the easiest syllogisms, the overall percentages shown in Table 3 (40% for children, 37% for adolescents, Table 1 . But, if we consider the subset of 28 syllogisms for the three age groups, the overall percentages of correct valid conclusions do reflect the expected trend: 40%, 50%, 57%, respectively. Table 4 shows the percentages of erroneous "no valid conclusion" responses to all syllogisms. The effect of figure is again highly reliable (Page's L Test, z = 6.25, p < .00001). In both cases, however, the actual data suggest that the principal difference is between the asymmetric and symmetric figures; moreover, the trend suggests that the A-B C-B figure is easier than the B-A B-C figure. The percentage of "no valid conclusion" responses given by younger subjects is very low, which may be because these subjects are biased against such responses or, as the model theory predicts, because these subjects are often unable to construct more than one model of the premises.
RESULTS
Overall results for syllogisms
Because model theory assumes that working memory capacity underlies both the effect of the number of models and the effect of figure, we carried out an analysis of variance (SPSS-PC) on the frequencies of correct valid conclusions as a function of these two variables (see Table 5 ), with age as covariate. The effect of models was reliable, F = 2414.7, p < .0001, as was the effect of figure, F = 16.04, p < .01, and they do interact according to our expectation, F = 6.352, p < .0001. In general, models and figure appear to exert about the same relative effect at each age.
Results for individual syllogisms
Certain aspects of the development of syllogistic performance become evident only if one examines performance on individual syllogisms (see Appendix). Many problems show a general tendency toward an improvement with age. These improvements can usually be ex- This ability to construct alternatives, particularly where an alternative breaks a link between tokens of the end terms, gave rise to some qualitative differences in the performance of the three groups. We lack the space to examine all of the cases in detail, but in the typical problem The increasing ability to construct alternative models accounts for the qualitative differences in the conclusions of the three groups for the following problems: EO in figure A- They are accordingly able to draw the correct negative conclusion:
Some of the C are not A. Table 6 summarizes the performance of the three age groups on the five component tasks.
Results of the five tasks
Interpretation of quantifiers. None of the groups did well in this task, and there was no improvement with age (Jonckheere Trend Test, z = 1.21, p > .1). All three groups tended to interpret "All the A are B" as meaning "All and only the A are B": Each of the children made this interpretation, and so did 14 of the adolescents and 14 of the adults. The adults tended to treat "Some of the A are B" as inconsistent with the case where the A's are a proper subset of the B's, but the other two groups performed more in accordance with the logical interpretation of "some," treating it as meaning "at least some, but possibly all." Insofar as adults converge on an interpretation of quantifiers, the bulk of their learning appears to have occurred prior to the age of 9 years.
Referential integration. The subjects, as we predicted, performed better with the referentially continuous sentences than with semicontinuous and discontinuous sentences (Wilcoxon Test, z = 4.87, p < .00001). There was no reliable improvement in performance with age: Neither the trend over the three groups (Jonckheere Trend Test, z = 0.52, p > .3) nor the difference between the two extreme age groups was significant (Mann-Whitney U Test, z = 1.39, p > .08). Hence, the ability to integrate referentially continuous assertions, such as those that occur in syllogisms, has clearly been mastered before 9 years of age.
Search for counterexamples. We scored the subjects' performance by subtracting the number of positive examples they selected from the number of counterexamples. Because each of the three trials used three positive instances and four counterexamples, a subject could obtain a minimum score of -9, and so we added 9 to the scores to ensure that all were positive. The majority of subjects (of all ages) selected both positive and negative instances; there was no significant improvement in performance as a function of age, and even the difference between the adults and children was not significant (MannWhitney U Test, z = 1.27, p > .1). These results suggest that intelligent 9-year-olds grasp the need in principle to search for counterexamples, and this finding is borne out by the fact that they do spontaneously respond that there is no valid conclusion to certain syllogisms.
Perception of identities. Five of the seven pairs of drawings ex- 
Results rlasting syllogistic performance and the five tasks
We carried out a set of stepwise multiple regressions (SPSS-PC) on the syllogistic data and the results from the five tasks. The dependent variable was performance with the 28 syllogisms for the children and all 64 syllogisms for the adolescents and adults; the independent variables were the results from the five tasks. We carried out multiple regressions for both overall performance on the syllogisms and, for heuristic reasons, performance on the three main sorts of syllogisms: one model; multiple-model with valid conclusions; and multiple-model with no valid conclusions. Table 7 summarizes the results of these multiple regressions.
Overall, the ability to detect identities accounts for about 31% of the variance, and working memory capacity accounts for a further 8% of the variance. A comparable pattern occurs for the multiplemodel problems with no valid conclusions, but the loading of the two tasks switches for one-model problems, where memory capacity accounts for about 16% of the variance and the detection of identities accounts for a further 6% of the variance. The detection of identities accounts for only 7% of the variance in performance with multiple- Note. The 28 syllogisms were used for children, and all 64 syllogisms for adolescents and adults.
model problems with valid conclusions, and memory capacity is not significantly correlated with performance on these problems. We also carried out a separate set of multiple regressions in which, in addition, the age of the subjects was treated as an independent variable. Age was always the best predictor of performance, accounting for 35% of the overall performance on syllogisms, with the detection of identities accounting for a further 6% of the variance. With age included as a factor, working memory capacity no longer produced any reliable correlations. For one-model syllogisms, age does not change the situation depicted in Table 7 . Working memory maintains a highly reliable correlation with performance (Pearson's rho = .4, p < .001), and the detection of identities confirms its prediction value (Pearson's rho = .39, p < .01). Once again, the multiple-model problems with valid conclusions produced results for which there were few significant correlations. In fact, the only variable to emerge from the multiple regression was age, which accounted for 30% of the variance.
Syllogistic reasoning in 7-year-old children
In our study of the component tasks, the 9-year-old children performed at almost the same level as adults in interpreting quantifiers, searching for counterexamples, and making referential integrations. It therefore seemed plausible that still younger children might be able to reason syllogistically, notwithstanding the claims by Piaget and his colleagues that syllogistic inference is impossible until children acquire formal operations at about 12 years of age (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1964) . To test whether young children could, in fact, make syllogistic inferences at a level better than chance, we gave twenty 7-year-old children five pairs of syllogistic premises. The subjects came from the same general population as those in our main study. The syllogisms were presented in the guise of a fairy story: The prince had to answer five questions to rescue the princess. Three of the problems were simple one-model problems with valid conclusions in the A-B, B-C figure; their premises were in the following moods: AA, IA, and AE, which required conclusions in the A, I, and E moods, respectively. Two further problems had no valid conclusion interrelating the end terms: The premises were in the II and EE moods in figure A-B C-B .
Six of the 20 subjects were unable to carry out the task: In fact, 4 of them responded "no valid conclusion" to all the problems. The remaining 14 subjects demonstrated the ability to draw syllogistic conclusions. Overall, there were 43% correct conclusions to the onemodel problems, and 45% correct responses to the problems with no valid conclusion. We can make a conservative estimate that the probability of guessing the correct response is .2 (there are four possible moods, and the "no valid conclusion" response). The estimate is conservative because it makes no allowance for guessing the appropriate terms in their correct places in the conclusion. Hence, the subjects were clearly performing reliably better than chance. Their errors with the invalid problems were almost always conclusions based on one model of the premises-a further 43% of their responses consisted of such errors. We conclude that some 7-year-old children are capable of simple syllogistic reasoning.
DISCUSSION
The first goal of our research was to show that model theory of syllogistic reasoning extends from adults to both adolescents and children. Our study has indeed shown that the same pattern of results occurs in all three age groups. The adults' performance corroborated the results of previous studies. They made 44% correct responses overall, which is well within the range reported in previous studies (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Steadman, 1978). The adolescents did not perform quite so well, and children performed less well than adolescents. Nevertheless, the performance of the children, who ranged from 9 to 10 years, was well above chance. They spontaneously drew valid conclusions to 66% of the one-model problems, where the chance of guessing the correct response is conservatively .2. Hence, children are able to make certain syllogistic inferences long before the proposed Piagetian stage of "formal operations."
The improvement in syllogistic ability from children to adults shows a trend toward a greater improvement for multiple-model problems with valid conclusions than for one-model problems. In fact, children are remarkably competent with one-model problems.
If the model theory is on the right lines, then the ability to make syllogistic inferences depends, as we argued earlier, on the following component skills:
1. Parsing sentences and using lexical and compositional principles of semantics to assemble a propositional representation of the premises. Syllogisms, in particular, call for a knowledge of the meanings of quantifiers.
2. The use of propositional representations to construct models that integrate the information provided by the premises.
3. The formulation of a putative conclusion, based on the content of the models, which makes explicit relations that are not expressed by any of the premises.
4. The search for alternative models of the premises that might refute a putative conclusion.
The identification, where relevant, of what is common to a set of models.
Our results imply that 9-year-old children, and perhaps some 7-year-olds, already have a grasp of the meaning of quantifiers comparable to that of adolescents and adults, and so the first of these components had no detectable effect on their inferential ability. Syllogisms depend on only three terms arranged in two premises, and so the referential problems that arise with them are minimal. Reasoners have to establish the two occurrences of the middle term and to use this knowledge to form an integrated model. This step is comparable to the interpretation of simple coreference in everyday discourse, whereas our test of the second of the skills above called for much more difficult problems to be solved, such as the interpretation of two sentences with no referent in common followed by a third sentence that integrated the two previous sentences. This skill is undoubtedly an interesting psycholinguistic measure, but it seems that the children we tested perform comparably to adults, and performance does not correlate with syllogistic ability. The third of the skills above-the ability to describe the contents of models in an informative way-is again one that the children appeared to have mastered, because they spontaneously drew such conclusions (especially to one-model problems). If we had tried to measure this ability in an experimental task, we suspect that the results would again have shown neither an improvement with age nor any relation to syllogistic ability.
The most disappointing feature of the results was our failure to devise a task that reflected an improvement in the search for counterexamples. As children grow older, they undoubtedly get better with multiple-model problems-both those with valid conclusions interrelating the end terms, and those with no such valid conclusions. The capacity to respond correctly to a multiple-model problem depends on finding an alternative model of the premises that refutes a putative conclusion, and on determining what conclusion, if any, is supported by the set of models. Successful reasoners must accordingly search for alternative models. We have argued elsewhere that the origins of this ability lie in a grasp of the truth or falsity of general assertions; for example, an assertion of the form "All A are B" is falsified by a single counterexample of an A that is not a B (see Johnson-Laird, 1990 ). Hence, the mechanism for searching for counterexamples may derive from the system for evaluating truth values. We suspect that this mechanism may not be in place, or may not function entirely adequately, in certain individuals. Unfortunately, our task for measuring this ability failed to reveal any developmental trend. The problem, we believe, was twofold:
1. Our analysis of performance with individual syllogisms has shown that the main trend in development is an improved ability to find alternative models. However, the crux of this capacity is the ability to break existing links between end terms, and to forge such links where none exist. Young children are apt to be unable to do either of these tasks, and so to given premises, such as Some of the A are B Some of the B are C they conclude: Some of the A are C.
Unfortunately, we did not design a component task that directly assessed the ability to break existing links or to forge new links. Indeed, it is difficult to know how one could investigate this ability without testing reasoning. The essence of reasoning according to the model theory is the ability to ensure that a conclusion has no counterexamples, and in this case of syllogisms it depends on making and breaking links. 2. Our counterexample task may have been too explicitly "metalogical." In syllogisms, reasoners appear to grasp the need to search for alternatives in a tacit way; however, their introspections yield very little about the details of the process by which they have reasoned. The counterexample task, however, required subjects to search ex-plicitly for evidence relevant to the truth or falsity of a generalization. It measured their insight into the principle that given a description, such as musicians with wind instruments that purports to describe individuals in a certain location, then it is necessary to know the location of individuals that do not fit the description. Their presence in the location falsifies the description.
If our diagnosis is correct, we have run into the central problems of designing tasks to measure component processes. On the one hand, if one seeks to isolate and to measure a component ability, then, inevitably, by isolating it from its normal place in a sequence of operations, one changes the ability that the subjects must display. They are now required to think in a conscious and explicit way about matters that normally lie outside awareness. On the other hand, the isolated ability may never occur by itself in any task other than a reasoning one. Hence, the component task turns out to be indistinguishable from an inferential one. Despite these difficulties, however, we cannot rule out the existence of an effective method to assess the ability to search for counterexamples by breaking and making alternative links in models. Such a method, we believe, would show a significant developmental trend, and a reliable correlation with syllogistic performance.
The task for measuring the fifth component-the detection of identities in different models-revealed a definite improvement in ability with age; it accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in syllogistic ability, and it did so even when age was taken into account in the multiple regression. Despite this success, we are not entirely convinced that the task measured the ability of subjects to establish the common features of models of syllogistic premises. Once again, the experiment calls for the explicit performance of a task that is rather different from the one that is needed in syllogisms. The perceptual task requires subjects to find identical shapes in complex figures, and the main improvement in age occurred with those figures in which the shapes are "hidden" by other features (e.g., one figure contains a pair of spectacles, and the other contains a lorry that has two wheels with the same geometrical shape). In syllogisms, however, reasoners have to appreciate that alternative models of the same premises support a common relation. Another relevant factor is the reliable correlation between the perception of identities and the capacity of working memory (Pearson's rho = .39, p < .01). Hence, although the detection of identities may measure an underlying component of syllogistic inference, it could be that both skills depend on another more fundamental process, namely, the processing capacity of working memory. A problem for the future is to explore the theoretical components of the perceptual task to determine whether there is any other elementary process likely to be common to syllogistic reasoning.
All five of the component skills require a working memory. If the information in such a memory fades rapidly, or if the capacity of such a memory is so small that, say, it is impossible to hold more than one syllogistic model in it at any time, then syllogistic reasoning will be very difficult. Our measure of working memory was simple and traditional, but it revealed a reliable improvement with age, and it accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in syllogistic performance over and above what was accounted for by the ability to detect perceptual identities. In general, we are confident that the pattern of results in Table 7 bears out the principle that as working memory improves-for whatever reason-it enables deductive reasoning to improve too. We have only one qualm about this claim, namely, the results for multiple-model problems with valid conclusions. None of the variables that we have examined, including working memory and age, account for much of the improvement in performance with this sort of syllogism. Older subjects do better with them, though their performance is never outstanding, but we have little idea about the cause of the improvement. These syllogisms are truly difficult and some of them are beyond the competence of nearly all logically untrained individuals. Yet, our adult subjects drew correct conclusions to them about one third of the time. The a priori probability of guessing a correct conclusion for these problems is approximately one in nine (only one of the eight sorts of conclusions All the A are C, All the C are A, etc., is correct, and the response "no valid conclusion" might also be guessed), and so this level of performance is clearly above chance on a binomial distribution. Beyond the detection of identities, which accounted for 7% of the variance, we do not know what accounts for our results. It is surprising that working memory capacity has no predictive power in this case.
Our findings corroborate the model theory of syllogistic reasoning. Every single subject performed better with one-model syllogisms than with multiple-model syllogisms. Indeed, we have never tested any subject in any experiment who has violated this law. Our findings also showed the usual effects of figure. Neither of these effects has been previously demonstrated with young subjects. There was a clear improvement in syllogistic reasoning as a function of age, and we have had some success in determining the likely causes of this improvement. Two of the component tasks that the subjects carried out provided measures that are relevant to this improvement: the detection of perceptual identities, which may reflect an ability to compare models of syllogistic premises; and working memory capacity, which seems central to most of the component processes of reasoning.
Three of our component tasks showed neither an improvement with age nor a relation to syllogistic reasoning. They failed because even the youngest of our subjects performed on these tasks at about the same level as adults. This phenomenon suggested to us that still younger children might be capable of syllogistic reasoning. They might have some knowledge of the meaning of quantifiers, the competence to use coreference to integrate premises, and the ability to describe informative relations in such models. We suspected that the weight of Piagetian tradition had prevented scholars from investigating this possibility. Indeed, we were able to show that some 7-year-old children are able to make one-model syllogistic inferences. Some of the component skills that we have explored in the present study may predict syllogistic ability among such younger children.
Appendix. Responses to syllogisms
The 64 pairs of syllogistic premises are shown, where each cell in Tables  A1-A4 
